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Most of us today are practicing collectivists! To be sure, it is a
private collectivism which we largely practice. Hence, "institutionalism"
may be a more palatable way of describing our system. The fact
remains that much of our socio-economic process is now channeled
through large-scale organizations, through large "collectives" of people
and equipment. In fact, the extensive collectivization of relations in the
labor market no longer does much to raise hackles in most quarters.
Collective bargaining has become an increasingly neutral word. It is
only when someone suggests that the contractual relations between, say,
the steel and auto industry, are also in the nature of collective bargains
(they are certainly institutional rather than individualistic ones), and
are a manifestation of what Gardner Means calls collective capitalism,
that some shock-reaction is still encountered. Suffice it to say that we
do much of our producing through, and much of our buying from, large-
scale economic units, and that collective bargaining in substantial
segments of the labor market takes place among giants.
This article will deal with the problem of individual employee rights
in employment relationships where collective bargaining predominates.
This brings us to a paradox. The notion underlying our national labor
policy for some thirty years has been that, absent collective bargaining,
individual employee rights are trammelled on by an all-powerful employer,
wielding unilateral and dictatorial controls.' Thus a collective institu-
* The author is indebted to Saul G. Kramer of the Class of 1959, Cornell Law School,
for research assistance rendered in the preparation of this article.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 83, for biographical data.
1 Thus, in Section 2 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102
(1952):
... the public policy of the United States is hereby declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of govern-
mental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms
of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be
free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection....
The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), echoed this approach, which was also retained in
the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952):
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
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tion is expected to enhance individual rights! It is with some products
of this paradox that we shall concern ourselves. In so doing, I shall
proceed on the assumption that we shall not, in the foreseeable future,
abolish either the large corporation or the union, and that, even if an
invigorated anti-trust policy were to attempt to circumscribe oligopolistic
or monopoloid price and wage fixing power here and there, the economy
will continue to be characterized by large, if not gargantuan, units. The
problems of enhancing individual rights in collective labor relations are
substantially the same whether an industry is dominated by the Big
Three or the Not-So-Big Six, and by three or four unions, rather than
one or two.
We may anticipate, then, that bargaining in the labor market will
continue to be collective, and that the employment relation is to be
governed by a collective labor agreement. What can and should the
law contribute toward effective protection of individual rights in this
essentially collective context? Put another way, to what extent do the
institutional needs of the employer, the union, and the collective bar-
gaining relationship place limitations on the scope of protection that
can and should be accorded to individual rights immersed in this complex
of collectivities?
Two main avenues of exploration seem open: Individual bargaining
by the employee with the large employer being an apparently illusory
futility, policy protects formation of unions for the purpose of striking
collective bargains. Individual rights in this context consequently must
be accorded protection, first, under the collective contract (vis-&-vis the
employer), and second, against (and within) the union. It will be seen
that these two approaches, though separate, are intertwined, for which
reason they will both be considered below.
B. INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE ENFORCEMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENT2
Three recent decisions will serve to illustrate several aspects of our
problem. They bear detailed examination.
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce ....
This was also the thrust of the so-called La Follette Committee investigation. See Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate,
pursuant to S. Res. 266, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)-76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1941). A
Resolution to Investigate Violations of the Right of Free Speech and Assembly and
Interference with the Right of Labor to Organize and Bargain Collectively.
2 The most comprehensive recent discussion of this and other questions concerning the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements will be found in Cox, "Rights Under a
Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956). See also, Cox, "Individual Enforcement
of Collective Bafgaining Agreements," 8 Lab. L.J. 850 (1957); Howlett, "Contract Rights
of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer," 8 Lab. LJ. 316 (1957); "Report of
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In Parker v. Borock,3 the Court of Appeals of New York had occasion
to consider the right of a former employee to bring action against his
employer grounded upon a discharge, allegedly wrongful, under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff-employee, a
member of the union, had been discharged for cause. He invoked the
contractual grievance procedure; the ensuing union-employer discussions
proved fruitless, the union declining to pursue the grievance to the
arbitration stage. An attempt by plaintiff in the Federal District Court
to compel the employer to arbitrate had failed.4  Parker then sued in
the state court for money damages for alleged breach of the collective
agreement. The employer first moved for a stay, pending arbitration. A
denial of the stay was affirmed by the Appellate Division5 on the theory
that there was no right, on the part of the employer, to arbitration in
the absence of a dispute between it and the union concerning the
propriety of the discharge. Subsequently, the defendant-employer moved
for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff, not being a party to the
collective agreement, secured no right of action thereunder. This motion
was denied. The Appellate Division reversed," deciding that while
plaintiff could maintain the action, he had failed to establish that his
individual hiring was for a definite term rather than a hiring at will.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.'
Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954,"
go Nw. U.L. Rev. 143 (1955). Earlier literature concerning the theoretical nature of
collective agreements is voluminous. E.g., Anderson, "Collective Bargaining Agreements,"
15 Ore. L. Rev. 229 (1936); Christenson, "Legally Enforceable Interests in American
Labor Union Working Agreements," 9 Ind. L.J. 69 (1933); Fuchs, "Collective Labor
Agreements in American Law," 10 St. Louis L. Rev. 1 (1925); Fumerton, "The Collective
Bargaining Agreement and its Legal Effects," 17 Wash. L. Rev. 181 (1942); Gregory, "The
Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope," 1949 Wash. U.L.Q. 3; Hamilton,
"Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor Contracts," 3 Mo. L. Rev. 252 (1938);
Lenhoff, "The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System," 39
Mich. L. Rev. 1109 (1941); Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law," 44
Harv. L. Rev. 572 (1931); Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 Yale
L.J. 195 (1938).
3 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959), affirming 1 App. Div. 2d
969, 150 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1956).
4 United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). Defendant subsequently
asserted in the state action that this determination rendered plaintiff's cause res adjudicata,
a contention rejected by the Court of Appeals. 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298, 182
N.Y.S.2d 577, 579. The language of the federal court was broad:
Naturally it is the employees who may have a difference with the Company. But
it is the employees in their union cloak and capacity only who may avail themselves
of the "Union function," which is the possibility of an eventual arbitration....
It is patently dear that the "enforcement" of the arbitration is purely a Union right.
The contract as a whole, as well as these provisions, all indicate that the arbitration is
between the Union and the Company concerning an employee. The long and the short
of it is that the "employee's difference with the Company" is or is not a union
"cause of action" which it may or may not advance to ultimate arbitration. If the
Union decides it has "no cause of action," the "employee's difference" is dissipated by
the decision of the sole bargaining agent, and he is bound thereby .... 124 F. Sup. at
546.
5 286 App. Div. 851, 141 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1955), affirming 136 N.Y.S.2d 588
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1954), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 731, 171 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1958).
8 1 App. Div. 2d 969, 150 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1956).
5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577.
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Burke, J., wrote the opinion for the court. His approach was grounded
on the theory that the plaintiff's individual contract of hire must be
read within the framework of the collective agreement, which provides
that "No regular employee shall be discharged or disciplined without
good and sufficient cause," and that layoffs were to take place only in
accordance with seniority. These clauses, the court concluded, inured to
the direct benefit of plaintiff,8 rejecting, by distinguishing it, an earlier
approach that seniority and discharge provisions in a collective agree-
ment were designed only to protect the interest of the union in the reten-
tion of union men in employment.9 Noting, however, that the agreement
further provided that it was to be binding upon the Union and its officers,
representatives and members, the court went on to find that plaintiff's
right of action was precluded by the contractual grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure which, by its terms, limited access thereto to the union
itself.'" The consequences of this analysis would appear to be that the
plaintiff is treated as the beneficiary of the employer's promise not to
discharge except for just cause, but that the employer has only promised
to entertain a claim of want of just cause when pressed by the union.
The limited character of the second of the promises hence served to
defeat the employee's effort to seek redress individually. The opinion of
the court concludes as follows:
A reading of the existing agreement indicates that plaintiff has entrusted
his rights to his union representative. It may be that the union failed to
preserve them. As was said in Donato v. American Locomotive Corp.,
(238 App. Div. 410, 417, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709, 716, affirmed 306 N.Y. 966,
120 N.E.2d 227): "the only conclusion which logically follows is that the
employee is without any remedy, except as against his own union, if he
claims that the union mishandled the arbitration proceeding or improperly
failed to move to vacate the award. If this conclusion is reached upon the
premise here set forth, this is not an exaltation of procedure over substance;
it rests rather upon a proposition of substantive law limiting the right of
the individual employee under a collective bargaining agreement."'1
Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion, elaborated on some of the con-
siderations supporting the result reached:
Discharge cases arise in the course of the administration of a collective
bargaining agreement. They may raise countless questions, such as inter-
pretation of the agreement, reasonableness of plant rules and regulations
and conformity with past practices. The exclusive representative is in the
best position, after investigating the truth and merits of the employee's
complaint and after weighing the many factors involved, to determine
whether uniformity in the administration of the agreement and protection
8 Id. at 160, 156 N.E.2d at 299, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
9 See Rotnofsky v. Capital Distributors Corp., 262 App. Div. 521, 30 N.Y.S.2d 563
(1st Dep't 1941).
10 5 N.Y.2d 156, 161, 156 N.E.2d 297, 299, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 581.
11 Id. at 161-62, 156 N.E.2d at 300, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
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of the group interests of the majority of employees require it to press or
abandon the case. Accordingly, absent specific language giving the em-
ployee the right to act on his own behalf, it is my conclusion that, under
a collective bargaining agreement such as the one before us-which con-
tains provision for the submission of unsettled disputes to arbitration-
the union alone has a right to control the prosecution of discharge cases ....
To the contention that this may subject the individual employee to
capricious or discriminatory action by the union, it is sufficient to observe,
as Judge Burke has intimated, that the employee has a remedy against the
union for breach of fiduciary duty if it unfairly discriminated against him.3
Judge VanVoorhis also concurred, but on the theory pursuant to which
the Appellate Division had decided the case. He noted that the portion
of the Donato opinion quoted had merely been dictum and that the
implications of that case, if anything, pointed to the right of the indi-
vidual employee to demand arbitration in the face of union neglect of
the employee's rights.13 Judge VanVoorhis asserted that "... . a union
cannot exert power over its members by attempting to provide in the
contract that what the union obtains for them the union can also take
away."
1 4
In Cortez v. Ford Motor Company and United Automobile Workers, 5
the Michigan Supreme Court was confronted by a similar problem, with
the added elements that the action was against the union as well as the
company, and sounded in tort as well as contract. The suit was brought
by three women employees of the company on their own behalf and on
behalf of 105 other women employees who had claims similar to plain-
tiffs'. These complained of loss of wages suffered by reason of allegedly
improper lay-offs. They asserted that Ford Motor Company had violated
contractual obligations arising out of the seniority provisions of the
collective agreement and that the union had contractual duties, arising
from the same agreement, to file grievances concerning the lay-offs. The
tort count alleged a conspiracy among the defendants to interfere with
plaintiffs' rights under the agreement. Motions to dismiss were granted
by the trial court for the following reasons: (1) the action was defec-
tive as to the union because internal union remedies had not been
exhausted by plaintiffs; (2) the collective agreement sued upon did not
contain promises by the union, inuring to the benefit of plaintiffs, to
process grievances; (3) the company's promises in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, although inuring to the benefit of plaintiffs, were ex-
12 Id. at 162, 156 N.E.2d at 300, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
13 See notes 63-66 infra and accompanying text.
14 5 N.Y.2d 156, 164, 156 N.E.2d 297, 301, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 583. The quoted statement
seems extreme. Compare Mayo v. Great Lakes Greyhound Lines, 333 Mich. 205, 213, 52
N.V.2d 665, 670 (1952); Ryan v. N.Y. Cen. R.R., 267 Mich. 202, 208-09, 255 N.W. 365,
367-68 (1934).
15 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957).
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pressly limited by the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure,
control over which, after the first stage, was expressly vested in union
hands; and (4) the tort count, by merely asserting that the alleged
breaches of contract took place pursuant to a conspiracy, added nothing
to plaintiffs' claim, no such breaches having been found to have taken
place. 6 The Michigan Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed. It adopted
in substance, with one exception, the reasoning and approach of the trial
judge. The exception was that the court apparently found it unnecessary
to rule on the union's claim that, as to the union, plaintiffs' entire cause
was fatally defective for failing to allege exhaustion of internal union
remedies. It "disposed of the other issues, in part, as follows:
Plaintiffs' pleadings and the exhibits stipulated in this case make it obvi-
ous that the union and its representatives received and considered plaintiffs'
grievance at great length and that the general problem with which the
grievance was concerned was the subject of extensive negotiation between
the union and the company, which negotiations resulted in a number of
supplemental memoranda interpreting the application of the seniority provi-
sions of the contract under the reduced working force conditions in the
Dearborn stamping plant ....
The essence of plaintiffs' complaint is really that the union failed to
accept plaintiffs' position upon this grievance, namely, that each of them
was, under the seniority provisions of the contract, entitled to a job at all of
the times concerned, and failed to urge it upon the coripany through all the
steps in the grievance procedure. There is no promise of this nature con-
tained in the contract. On the contrary, the contract makes amply clear
that union representatives have discretion to receive, pass upon and with-
draw grievances presented by individual employees.
Our Court has repeatedly held that proper exercise of such discretion
over grievances and interpretation of contract terms in the interest of all
its members is vested in authorized representatives of the union, subject
to challenge after exhaustion of the grievance procedure only on grounds
of bad faith, arbitrary action or fraud.
In this regard, we are mindful of the fact that individual members of
the union may under certain circumstances enforce fair and proper repre-
sentation of their interests on the part of their union representatives by
legal action. The union's duty of fair representation is founded upon the
relationship between the union and the members as recited in the constitu-
tion and by-laws of the organization ... or in the duty imposed upon the
union of fair representation by State or Federal labor statutes ....
With respect to the limitations upon the employer's promises the
court had this to say:
The contract currently considered provided for layoffs in order of sen-
16 Record, pp. 63-87, Cortez v. Ford Motor Company, supra note 15. It is of interest
to note that one of the three named plaintiffs and ten of their 105 assignors had taken an
appeal to the International Executive Board of the Union and had apparently prevailed.
None of them, however, had fully exhausted their internal remedies. Record, pp. 17, 36-37.'
Reply Brief for Union Defendants-Appellees, p. 5.
17 349 Mich. 108, 120-24, 84 N.W.2d 523, 529-30.
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iority where ability to perform a job was present. It further provided for
negotiations between the company and the union in the event of any dis-
pute over the problem of ability. It further provided a detailed grievance
procedure ending in an impartial umpire's final decision, with said proce-
dure made available to employees either through complaint to their union
district committeeman or to their foreman. We are now asked to hold that
this contractual machinery for settlement of grievances should be sup-
planted by a court judgment as to whether each individual job in the
Dearborn stamping plant was suitable for female employment, and whether
each of these individual female employees was able to perform a job then
held by a man with lesser seniority.
It is obvious that the contracting parties, by the express language of their
contract, did everything humanly possible to agree to avoid such an even-
tuality. It is likewise obvious that for the courts to undertake such a task
would quickly bring the wheels of industry to a standstill, along with the
wheels of justice. Under the third-party beneficiary statute, plaintiffs, in
seeking to enforce the seniority promises of the company under exhibit 1,
are limited by the express provisions of the contract upon which they rely.
Further, although not essential to our decision, the record indicates a
failure on the part of plaintiffs to exhaust their contractual remedy before
appealing to the courts.' 8
The picture emerging from this decision is that of the employee sub-
stantially boxed in between two massive institutions. On one side is a
large corporation with employees numbering in the hundreds of thou-
sands. On the other, a labor organization with a million members and
an inevitably formidable organizational structure of officialdom and
appeals. Relations between the two are governed by collective "agree-
ments" running into the hundreds of pages, looking more like complex
statutory enactments than contracts, and containing a quasi-judicial
enforcement machinery, access to which is denied the employee when
the bargaining representative declines to act.
To some of the problems raised by this picture, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland addressed itself in Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J.
Kurdle Co.' This was a suit for damages by an employee who was a
member of the union, based on her discharge, allegedly in violation of
the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff alleged
that the union refused to arbitrate her grievance and had thereby acted
in a "discriminatory, wilful and arbitrary manner." The action was
against the' employer who had refused plaintiff's request for reinstate-
ment with back pay. The employer's demurrer, asserting that the suit
was barred by the collective agreement, was sustained by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reversed, rendering an exhaustive
18 Id. at 125, 126, 84 N.W.2d at 531-32. The ruling was in accord with well settled
Michigan authority. Leadon v. Detroit Lumber Co., 340 Mich. 74, 64 N.W.2d 681 (1954);
Zdero v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 338 Mich. 549, 61 N.W.2d 615 (1953).
19 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958).
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opinion. The court decided, at the outset, that the individual employee
secures enforceable rights under those provisions of the collective con-
tract (dealing with wages, seniority, wrongful discharge, etc.) which
peculiarly affect his individual rights.2 0 However, the court recognized
that "the employer does not wish to be harassed with a lawsuit each
time an employee has a grievance .... Hence the collective bargaining
agreement usually provides for a detailed procedure through which all
grievances are channeled."'" The grievance procedure in Jenkins was not
entirely clear as to where control over grievances to be processed rested
in the first four stages. It is clear that arbitration was available only
upon application of the Company or Union, although the results of such
arbitration were to be conclusive upon employees as well.22 The court
then proceeded to consider the impact of such a grievance machinery
upon the employee's right of action:
The general rule is that before an individual employee can maintain a
suit, he must show that he has exhausted his contractual remedies: "This
rule, which is analogous to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies as a condition precedent to resorting to courts2 .. .is based
on a practical approach to the myriad problems, complaints and grievances
that arise under a collective bargaining agreement. It makes possible the
settlement of such matters by a simple, expeditious and inexpensive proce-
dure, and by persons who, generally, are intimately familiar therewith....
The use of these internal remedies for the adjustment of grievances is
designated not only to promote settlement thereof, but also to foster more
harmonious employee-employer relations." Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.
App. 2d 558, 564, 277 P.2d 464, 468 (1954). Thus, if the employee refuses
to take even the initial step of requesting the processing of the grievance, he
will not be granted relief in the courts. The difficulty arises when he presents
his grievance to the union and he is dissatisfied with the way in which the
union handles his case. There are not many cases on this issue, but the
trend seems to be that he cannot sue the employer if he does not like the
result of the union efforts at negotiation. 24
This, however, the Court decided was not the case before it. No claim
was made by the employer, either that the contractual grievance proce-
dure had not been invoked, or that the allegations of willfulness, arbi-
trary conduct and discrimination on the part of the Union for refusing
to invoke arbitration were conclusions of the pleader insufficient to sup-
port the action.25 The narrow issue raised by the employer was that, in
20 Id. at 559, 144 A.2d at 90.
21 Id. at 560, 144 A.2d at 90.
22 Id. at 560-61, 144 A.2d at 90-91.
23 (Author's note.) The rule is similarly analogous to that requiring exhaustion of
internal remedies prior to bringing actions against a private association. See nn.110-113
infra and accompanying text.
24 217 Md. 556, 561-62, 144 A.2d 88, 91.
25 Id. at 562, 144 A.2d at 92. Precisely such an attack was made on plaintiffs' pleadings
in the Cortez case. Reply Brief for Union Defendants, pp. 3-4.
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the face of such refusal on the part of the Union, the employee's
action on the contract was nevertheless barred. This assertion the
court declined to accept. 6 The order of dismissal was reversed, and the
case remanded, the court withholding decision on the question of whether
the union was a necessary party.
2 7
Several significant observations were made by the court in the course
of its opinion: (1) Regardless of the presence or absence of express
language so stating, the contractual remedy for the processing of griev-
ances was exclusive, both as to individual, group or union grievances.28
(2) Hence, as a general rule, the employer is entitled to immunity from
suits by individual employees, provided "that the union is to consider
carefully and fairly the alleged grievances of its members, that it is
likewise to exercise its judgment and discretion fairly on behalf of its
individual members in determining upon what terms it believes any griev-
ances of theirs should be adjusted and whether such grievances should be
carried to arbitration, if negotiations for settlement or adjustment fail."29
But where, as here, the union was alleged to have acted in an arbitrary
and discriminatory manner, in failing to proceed, the suit is not barred.
The court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily upon an analysis
recently put forward by Professor Cox for dealing with this problem,
quoting him, in part, as follows:
Another alternative is to allow the employee to bring suit against the em-
ployer and the union as co-defendants upon analogy to the bill in equity
which the beneficiary of a trust may maintain against the trustee who fails
to press a claim against a third person. The suit would fail on the merits
if it appeared that the collective bargaining representative had dropped the
grievance for lack of merit or had negotiated a reasonable adjustment.30
In my opinion the presumption should be against individual enforcement
of a collective bargaining agreement unless the union has unfairly refused to
act .... The bargaining representative would be guilty of a breach of duty
if it refused to press a justifiable grievance either because of laziness,
prejudice, or unwillingness to expend money on behalf of employees who
were not members of the union. Individual enforcement would then become
appropriate. The proper remedy would be an action against the union and
employer analogous to the action maintained by the beneficiary against the
debtor of a trust when the trustee refuses to bring the action. It would be
a defense to show that the union and employer had made a settlement or
that the union's decision not to press the claim was honest and reasonable. 3'
A more complete understanding of our problem may be gained by
26 Cf. Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
27 217 Md. 556, 576, 144 A.2d 88, 99.
28 Id. at 562, 144 A.2d at 92.
29 Id. at 564, 144 A.2d at 93.
30 Quoted at 217 Md. 565, 144 A.2d 93 from Cox, "Rights under a Labor Agreement,"
69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 652 (1956).
31 Quoted at 217 Md. 565, 144 A.2d 93 from Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective
Bargaining Agreements," 8 Lab. LJ. 850, 858 (1957).
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a brief review of other decisions, both from New York and elsewhere,
which form the background against which the cases previously discussed
were decided. One of the cases referred to by the court in Parker was
Rotnofsky v. Capital Distributors Corp.2 This was an action for breach
of an employment contract. The plaintiff claimed that he had been dis-
charged in violation of rights to continuous employment derived from
the collective bargaining agreement as incorporated in his individual
employment contract. The collective agreement contained typical dis-
charge and seniority provisions. The defendant employer moved for
summary judgment which was granted and affirmed on appeal. The
court reasoned that plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary of the
promises in the collective agreement upon which his claim rested, but
rather that these were included for the benefit of the union, contracting
as principal, to ensure the retention in employ of union men. 3 The
court, in Parker, distinguished the Rotnofsky case, and it is not clear to
what extent the somewhat startling reasoning of this decision was there
rejected by implicationf 4
The fact that the Rotnofsky approach, until fairly recently, retained
some vitality, at least, is demonstrated by Hudak v. Hornell Industries5
A group of employees, as third party beneficiaries, filed suit against the
employer for breach of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
The contract was for a fixed term, contained typical discharge and arbi-
tration provisions, and also included a clause specifically providing that
the company would continue to employ members of the union employed
at the time of its making for the duration of the agreement. The four
plaintiffs lost their employment as a result of a permanent shut-down of
the employer in the middle of the contract period. The employer de-
fended on the theory of the Rotnofsky decision, as well as on the basis
that arbitration under the contract was a necessary condition precedent
to bringing suit, and that the plaintiffs were, in any event, not the proper
parties either to invoke arbitration or to bring suit. The trial court's
dismissal of the complaint was reversed on appeal. It was reasoned
that the collective agreement was of such a nature as to make the four
individual plaintiff-employees third party beneficiaries. As they were
key men for the employer's operation, the wording of the contract clause
relating to continuous employment "was virtually tantamount to naming
82 262 App. Div. 521, 30 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1st Dep't 1941).
83 Id. at 525, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
34 5 N.Y.2d 156, 160, 156 N.E.2d 297, 299, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580. The Rotnofsky
approach was followed in Neves v. P. S. Thorsen & Co., Inc., 35 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Queens,
N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1942) (employee action dismissed). The same action was stayed in P. S.
Thorsen & Co. v. Neves, 179 Misc. 11, 37 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1942).
35 304 N.Y. 207, 106 N.E.2d 609 (1952).
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them."38 This made the contract being sued upon one directly between
the employees and the employer, which meant that the grievance and
arbitration machinery relating to disputes between the union and the
employer was not applicable. Rotnofsky could thus be distinguished on
the theory that the contract clause relied upon inured to the individual
interest of the employees rather than the collective interest of the union.
The strained reasoning of both Rotnofsky and Hudak illustrates that
the New York courts have yet to determine upon a coherent theory of
the collective agreement lending itself to ready application.
The Parker decision was anticipated in Ott v. Metropolitan Jockey
Club. 7 The plaintiff sued the employer on the collective agreement
alleging he had been improperly discharged. The employer moved for a
stay pending arbitration. The contract contained an arbitration clause,
seniority provisions, and a clause limiting discharges to those for wrong-
ful conduct. Plaintiff asserted that he had not conducted himself wrong-
fully and that the arbitration clause was not applicable in the absence
of a dispute between the "parties" to the agreement. The Appellate
Division, in a decision affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals,
granted the employer's request for a stay. It was reasoned that the
arbitration provisions of the collective agreement inured to the benefit
of the plaintiff, and that he was consequently bound by them. One judge
would have affirmed the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the
action on the theory that arbitration was the full and exclusive remedy
for breach of the agreement, and that since the time for arbitration of
the contract had expired, the stay was a futile gesture. On either theory
the action was barred.
38
Di Rienzo v. Farrand Optical Company9 most clearly foreshadows
the rule crystallized in the Parker case. This was an action against the
union and employer by an employee for recovery of wages allegedly lost
as the result of a breach of the seniority provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The defendant union moved for a stay pending arbi-
tration. The stay was granted in spite of the employee's claim that the
union had waived its right thereto by its prior action. It was reasoned
that the employee could not rely for his cause of action on the seniority
provisions of the contract and at the same time disregard other sections
providing for the processing of grievances. The grievance procedure
must be exhausted by the employee, and even where it has been, this
36 Id. at 212, 106 N.E.2d at 611.
87 307 N.Y. 696, 120 N.E.2d 862 (1954), affirming 282 App. Div. 946, 125 N.Y.S.2d 163
(2d Dep't 1953).
38 But see Kadish v. New York Evening News, 7 L.R.RM. 672 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
39 148 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Bx. N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1956).
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does not give the employee a cause of action for damages against the
employer. ° The court noted that the employee is not without remedies,
to wit, Section 9 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act,41 and an action against the
union for tortious mishandling of his grievance.42
A number of jurisdictions have not accepted what appears to be the
general decisional trend of treating individual employee actions on the
collective contract as barred by a union-controlled grievance procedure.
Thus, the grievance procedure has been deemed to be exhausted where
only the union may invoke it and where the union fails to do so. 43 The
employee's action has been allowed on the theory that the grievance
procedure embraces only collective, and not individual grievances. 44 The
trading away of individual grievances in return for a collective advan-
tage has been viewed as beyond the bargaining agent's authority.45 In
one case, pre-arbitration stages of the grievance procedure were inter-
40 See also Smithey v. St. Louis S. Ry. Co., 237 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1956) (applying
Arkansas law); Anson v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 222 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1955)
(action dismissed, applying Illinois law); Peoples v. Southern Pac. Co., 139 F. Supp.
783 (D. Oregon 1955) (applying Oregon law); Petty v. Missouri & A. Ry. Co.,
205 Ark. 990, 167 S.W.2d 895 (1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 738 (1944); St. Louis, IM. & S.
Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897); Terrell v. Local Lodge 758, Int'l
Ass'n of Mach., 141 Cal. App. 2d 17, 296 P.2d 100 (1956), 150 Cal. App. 2d 24, 309 P.2d
130 (1957); Williams v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 147 Cal. App. 2d 1, 304 P.2d 715 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. of App. 1956); Cone v. Union Oil Co. of California, 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 277
P.2d 464 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1954); Gambrel v. United Mine Workers of America,
249 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1952); Jorgenson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d
24 (1958); Berens v. Robineau, 278 App. Div. 710, 103 N.Y.S.2d 168 (2nd Dep't 1951)
(employee action on collective agreement stayed pending arbitration); Rosen v. Seagram
Distillers Corp., 54 N.Y.S.2d 322 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1944) (action dismissed); Johnson
v. Kings County Lighting Co., 141 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955) (action
stayed); Spilkewitz v. Pepper, 159 N.Y.S.2d 53 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (action stayed);
Povey v. Midvale Co., 175 Pa. Super. 395, 105 A.2d 172 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
875 (1954).
41 This was a reference to the proviso at 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952),
amending 49 Stat. 453 (1935), purporting to be a limitation upon the powers of the
exclusive statutory collective bargaining representative by giving, both prior and following
its amendment, individual employees or groups of employees the "right" to present grievances
directly to the employer. It has been argued that the proviso should be interpreted as
establishing an "enforceable" right on the part of the employee against the employer. Report
of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, 50
Nw. U.L. Rev. 143, 169-177 (1955); Howlett, "Contract Rights of the Individual Employee
as Against the Employer," 8 Lab. L.J. 316, 317-319 (1957). However, the NLRB General
Counsel has ruled that it is not unlawful for an employer to,refuse to entertain individual
grievances. Case No. 418, CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 11913 (1952); Case No. 317, CCH Lab.
L. Rep. para. 11588 (1952). The same position is taken in Cox, "Rights Under a Labor
Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 624 (1956) and Duneau, "Employee Participation in the
Grievance Aspects of Collective Bargaining," 50 Col. L. Rev. 731, 746 (1950). The statutory
context and history of the proviso tend to support the view that it was inserted largely for
the purpose of affording a defense against unfair labor practice charges for employers,
willing or desiring to entertain individual grievances, in the face of an exclusive collective
bargaining representative.
42 Accord, Guszkowski v. United States Trucking Corp., 162 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1958)
(applying New Jersey law). Contra Patrick v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 156 F. Supp. 336
(D.N.J. 1957).
43 Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So.2d 98 (1957).
44 Kosley v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 251 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1958) (applying Indiana law).
45 Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
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preted by the court as not binding, leaving the individual employee free
to sue over grievances concerning which the union had negotiated but
did not press to arbitration. 46 Invocation of the grievance procedure
prior to suit has been considered unnecessary where the discharged
employee sued for damages rather than reinstatement,47 where arbitra-
tion is, as a matter of state policy 48 or contract language, 49 a concurrent
rather than exclusive remedy, where there is no arbitration clause,50 or
where the facts suggest that processing the complaint through the griev-
ance procedure would be useless. 5' Absent peculiarities in the language
of the grievance clauses of the collective contract involved, it seems diffi-
cult to justify individual employee actions on any of the theories enu-
merated above. Where the employer has promised to entertain griev-
ances over claimed violations of the collective agreement when processed
by the union, it is difficult to see how, on any theory of contract, the
employer may be held liable in the absence of a claim, on the part of the
union, of a breach.5" And considerations of collective bargaining policy
strongly point in the same direction. The underlying function of collec-
tive bargaining, certainly, is to provide a reasonably satisfactory means
for private adjustments of a complex cluster of relationships among
unions, employees and employers. An answer to the contention that
this approach is destructive of individual interests and rights is that
the union must discharge its collective bargaining responsibilities in a
fair manner. A tort action will lie against the union where this duty has
been breached.
Where the breach by the union occurs under circumstances suggesting
collusion with the employer, little analytical difficulty is encountered in
holding the employer liable in tort as well. It seems considerably more
46 In re Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co., 100 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951) (Connecticut
law).
47 Dufour v. Continental Southern Lines, 219 Miss. 296, 68 So. 2d 489 (1953). See Tri-
State Transit Co. of Louisiana v. Rawls, 191 Miss. 573, 1 So. 2d 497 (1941); Moore v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937).
48 Laminonds v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 243 N.C. 749, 92 S.E.2d 143 (1956). See also, Flaherty
v. Metal Products Corp., 83 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
49 Pettus v. Olga Coal Co., 137 W. Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881 (1952).
50 Nelson v. General Electric Co., 145 A.2d 576 (Munic. Ct. of App. D.C. 1958).
51 United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952).
52 There can be even less doubt that the union is not liable to the employee for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement when it improperly fails to process a grievance. That
conclusion reached in Cortez supra n.15 seems beyond challenge. See also Cabral v. Molders
Union, 82 R.I. 178, 106 A.2d 739 (1954). A member might conceivably bring a contract
action against his union grounded upon the union's by-laws. And there were, in Cortez,
allegations in the tort count of a breach by the union of its duties under its constitution.
Record, p. 19. Cortez v. Ford Motor Company, supra n.16. But these were ignored in
the decision. Finally, a contractual grievance machinery is conceivable in which the employer
secures a union promise to process all meritorious grievances. Such a promise presumably
would inure to the benefit of the employees as third-party beneficiaries. This, however, runs




difficult, in the case of arbitrary union refusal to process a grievance, to
hold the employer liable on any contract theory in the absence of collu-
sion. To that extent, the result reached in Jenkins may be questionable.
Suppose that the grievance machinery of a collective contract requires
the filing of grievances by the union within five days of the incident
precipitating the complaint. Even if we assume the union's refusal to
file the grievance to be arbitrary, it is difficult to see on what theory
of contract the employer has bound himself to the individual employee.
In the absence of a grievance, timely filed, two practical solutions suggest
themselves for resolution of this problem. The employer would appear
to be in a position least engendering sympathy where his action is a gross
and plain violation of the contract, i.e., where the contract specifies $2.50
per hour, the employer pays $2.00 per hour, and the union, for no
apparent reason, refuses to grieve. Possibly in such a case the employee
should be free to proceed forthwith against both union and employer.
Or,. alternatively, perhaps in such a case collusion should be readily
inferred. It is apparent, however, that there are not apt to be many such
cases, and that the more typical situation is that of an individual em-
ployee genuinely feeling himself to be aggrieved, with an equally genuine
dispute either between himself and the union as to which interpretation
of the contract is in the interest of the majority of the employees in the
unit, or between the union and the employer, with the union in the
particular case accepting the employer's interpretation. This group of
situations is believed to represent the overwhelming majority of the
cases. And it is here that judicial second-guessing at the behest of indi-
vidual employees is most'likely to disturb private adjustments honestly
arrived at, with consequent disruption of labor relations, clogged griev-
ance and arbitration machinery, and an undermining of responsible
private accommodation. It may not be untoward to suggest that, before
any rule of law is fully crystallized to deal with this problem, research
be undertaken in a variety of industrial establishments to ascertain what
actual union practice and employee experience has been with regard to
grievances filed, rejected, processed, or compromised.
A possible approach for dealing with this second, more typical group
of situations, would be to allow the aggrieved employee to bring an action
on the contract against the employer somewhat analogous to a derivative,
shareholder's suit.58 The union would have to be joined, and the issue in
the case would be not only whether the employer breached the agree-
ment but also whether the union acted improperly in not pressing the
53 The idea of derivative actions by union-members is also contained in § 501(b) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 1959 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2953, 2975-76.
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grievance. The employee would prevail upon an affirmative answer to
both questions. The outcome of the litigation would, in other words,
attempt to produce precisely the result which would have been achieved,
had the union properly done its job in the grievance machinery. This
approach, in putting the aggrieved individual in the position of enforcing
the union's rights and duties under the grievance procedure, avoids the
analytic difficulties otherwise encountered in holding the employer liable
on the contract, in the absence of a grievance filed by the union pur-
suant to a union controlled grievance machinery. Even this approach
is not wholly without its problems in situations where there are stringent
time limitations for the filing of grievances under the contract. But
where there are not, there is no difficulty in letting the employee sue, in
effect, on behalf of the bargaining representative, and in delaying the
derivative action until after the employee has exhausted such reasonably
expeditious internal union remedies as might be available to him for
securing proper representation on the part of the bargaining agent. 4
The tendency in the decisions towards limiting redress for individual
employees to the contractual adjustment machinery has two conse-
quences. First, employees have attempted individually to invoke that
machinery by suing to compel arbitration, or to intervene at some stage
in an arbitration proceeding affecting them. Second, it is leading to a
fuller exploration of the bargaining representative's duty of fair repre-
sentation, and to attempts at enhancing the rights of employees as union
members.Y5
A bridge between the cases barring individual enforcement of the col-
lective agreement because of the presence of a union-controlled grievance
procedure, and those involving attempts at individual intervention in the
54 The complexities in evolving a rule to deal with these problems suggests caution in
resolving inherent jurisdictional difficulties. Suits by and against labor organizations on
collective contracts affecting commerce are cognizeable under federal law and in the federal
courts under § 301 of Taft-Hartley. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952). Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). But see Association of
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). Sec.
301 has been interpreted as not giving the federal courts jurisdiction over suits, by
individual employees, although the statutory language does not require this result. Schatte
v. International Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950), affirming 84
F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950). As a result of the Lincoln
Mills decision, supra, suits in state courts on collective contracts affecting interstate commerce
appear to be governed by federal § 301 law. But what of suits by individual employees?
It would appear desirable ultimately to have all such actions governed by a coherent and
uniform code, especially as liability under the rule suggested would depend on the statutory
bargaining agent's federal duty of fair representation. But the time is probably not yet
ripe for resolution of these problems. Compare Cox, "The Duty of Fair Representation,"
2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 169-177 (1957); Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representa-
tion: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System," 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1351-56 (1958).




grievance procedure is provided by two New York decisions which com-
menced as actions of the first category. In re Julius Wile Sons & Com-
pany" was a proceeding to vacate a stay of action pending arbitration.
The employee had brought suit for violation of rights as established by
a collective bargaining agreement. The State Board of Mediation had
previously refused to name an arbitrator because the employee, who
had requested it to act, was not a party signatory to the contract. The
collective bargaining representative had refused to bring the employee's
grievance to arbitration. After the employee commenced action, the
latter was stayed at the request of the employer. In the proceeding to
vacate the stay, the employer took the position that the plaintiff's only
course was to seek redress from the union. The court decided that the
stay was to be maintained on terms. It reasoned that the plaintiff should
not have been made the victim of the impasse. The only right assured to
the employer was that the dispute be arbitrated. The employer may
insist on this right, by arbitrating the claim with the employee. But the
employer could not both bar the individual's suit and insist that he was
only obligated to deal with the union, when the union refused to press
the employee's grievance. To a similar affect was Tremarchi v. Sheffield
Farms Company. 7 In that case the court entertained a petition by a
group of employees to compel their employer to arbitrate an overtime
pay dispute, ruling that while the arbitration clause in the collective con-
tract does not give the employees the right to require either the union
or the employer to arbitrate, they would be free to sue the employer
directly on the collective contract if (1) the union refused their demand
to arbitrate the grievance for them (allowing the individuals involved to
intervene in the proceeding), and (2) if the employer refused to arbitrate
with the employees individually (the employees sharing the cost of the
arbitration). These decisions must be contrasted with the great weight
of authority in New York that individual employees can not compel the
employer to arbitrate, where the arbitration clause indicates the arbitra-
tion is to be between the union and the employer."5 Further, their vitality
56 199 Misc. 654, 102 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951).
57 26 Lab. Arb. 741 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956).
58 The leading case is Biancuili v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 14 Misc. 2d 297, 115 N.Y.S.2d
715 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1952). The court, in a famous passage, there stated:
The philosophy of the Union in retaining control over disputes and of the Company
in requiring -the same is sound. A contrary procedure which would allow each indi-
vidual employee to overrule and supersede the governing body of a Union would
create a condition of disorder and instability which would be disastrous to labor as well
as industry .... Id. at 299, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
See also Calca v. Tobin Packing Co., 12 Misc. 2d 455, 176 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1958); Brettner v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 725, 168 N.Y.S.2d
180 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957); Cox v. R. H. Macey & Co., 14 Misc. 2d 294, 152
N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956); Shalgen v. Lipsett, Inc., 14 Misc. 2d
296, 116 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1952); Kaufman v. Leather Workers, 9 Lab. Arb. 1030 (Sup. Ct.
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appears to have been considerably dissipated by the decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York in the Parker case.59
Intervention by individual employees in union-employer arbitrations
has, in some instances, been allowed. In the Matter of Iroquois Bev-
erage Corp., 60 a group of employees moved to intervene in arbitration
proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement. The union had
brought a grievance to arbitration which, if won by the union, would have
improved the seniority of 32 employees at the expense of the petitioners.
Both the employer and the union opposed the intervention, citing Bian-
culli and related decisions."' The court granted the motion to intervene,
noting that the petitioners were not attacking the union's right to arbi-
trate, and apparently relying in particular upon the fact that the present
dispute with the employer was the consequence of a collusive seniority
arrangement of some years' standing. This rendered the union morally
untrustworthy and over-rode such risks of confusion as ordinarily might
be entailed in intervention of this sort.
6 2
The precise sweep of the approach represented by the Iroquois Co.
decision is not clear. The most exhaustive treatment of the problem by
a New York court will be found in Donato v. American Locomotive Co.
63
That decision, however, must be considered in light of the treatment it
subsequently received by the Court of Appeals in the Parker case.
Hence, it seems questionable, at best, whether, absent special circum-
N.Y. County 1948); Petition of Minasian 14 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
See also Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 affirming
283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709 (3rd Dep't 1954); Matter of New York Times Co.,
and Newspaper Guild of New York, Local 3, 2 App. Div. 2d 31, 152 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st
Dep't 1956). For contrary holdings, see Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 117, 139
A.2d 611 (1958) ; Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 98, 145 A.2d 137 (1958).
See also Fagliarone v. Consolidated Film Indus., Inc., 20 N.J. Misc. 193, 26 A.2d 425
(1942); General Cable Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 443 (arbitration award, 1953).
50 See nn.6-10, supra, and accompanying text.
60 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1955).
61 See n.58, supra.
62 Accord, Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 278 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1957), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1958), rearg. denied and
appeal granted, 7 App. Div. 2d 845, 182 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1st Dep't 1959). Cf. General
Warehousemen's Union, Local 852 v. Glidden Co., 9 Misc. 2d 648, 169 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1957) (Intervention allowed under general provisions of New York Civil
Practice Act. § 193-b(1) C.P.A.); Application of American Machine & Foundry Co., 193
Misc. 990, 85 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,
28 Lab. Arb. 64 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (dictum); Busch Jewelry Co., Inc. v. United
Retail Employees' Union, Local 830, 170 Misc. 482, 10 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1939) (employees have standing to move to set aside arbitration award affecting them);
Curtis v. New York World Telegram Corp., 282 App. Div. 183, 121 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st
Dep't 1953); Publishers' Ass'n of New York City v. New York Typographical Union,
168 Misc. 267, 5 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938). But see I. Miller & Sons, Inc.
v. United Office and Professional Workers, Local 16, 195 Misc. 20, 88 N.Y.S.2d 573
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949); Darrell v. Newshaeffer, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 240 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1954); In re Spottswood, 88 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).




stances, intervention by affected individuals either will be or should
be allowed. In the Donato case, plaintiff claimed he had been dis-
charged by the employer under circumstances not constituting "proper
cause" within the meaning of the applicable collective agreement. He
protested the discharge, and preliminary steps of the grievance proce-
dure were invoked. Subsequently, arbitration was demanded by the union
and took place, but only after a delay of over one year. A tripartite
arbitration panel upheld the discharge by a vote of two to one. The
impartial member of the panel who cast the deciding vote concluded,
"that Donato's discharge was not originally justified," but that the union's
lack of diligence amounted to acquiescence by it to the company's judg-
ment. 4 Plaintiff's complaint originally alleged that the defendant union
had "wrongfully, negligently and maliciously" failed to protect his rights.
Plaintiff sued for reinstatement and damages. This complaint had been
dismissed as to both the union and employer on motion for legal insuffi-
ciency. The dismissal had been affirmed,"5 but the court granted plaintiff
leave to amend, suggesting that an action in equity might lie to vacate the
arbitration award. Plaintiff subsequently so amended. In considering
the legal sufficiency of the amended complaint, the Appellate Division
concluded that decisions of the Court of Appeals handed down in the
interval settled that the statutory method for vacating arbitration awards
was exclusive, that plaintiff's action had been brought too late to meet the
statutory time requirements, and that a plenary suit in equity could not
be brought as a substitute for the statutory action. Halpern, J., writing
for the Court, extensively reviewed the law bearing generally upon the
problem:
If every person who had an interest in an arbitration proceeding to which
he was not a party had the right to attack it by a plenary suit in equity, the
situation would be a chaotic one . . . . Thus, for example, it would be
readily agreed that if the beneficiaries of a trust were represented in an
arbitration proceeding by the trustee, the beneficiaries would be bound by
the award and the only permissible method of attacking it would be by
motion to vacate made by the trustee in the manner and within the time
prescribed by law....
The plaintiff entrusted his grievance solely to the hands of his union....
He obviously consented to have his union represent him in the arbitration
proceeding and he is bound by its conduct of the proceeding. In this situa-
tion if the plaintiff has any grievance, it is against his own union.
We are not called upon to decide in this case what remedies plaintiff might
have had if he had acted promptly and had pursued a different course. If
that question were before us, the answer to it would depend upon the choice
which we would make between conflicting views as to the rights of an indi-
64 283 App. Div. 410, 412, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711.
65 279 App. Div. 545, 111 N.Y.S.2d 434 (3rd Dep't 1952).
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vidual employee under a conventional collective bargaining agreement. The
law upon this subject is still in a state of flux ....
(1) If it is held that an employee has no right to intervene in an arbitra-
tion proceeding or to make a motion to vacate the award, this must be upon
the ground that the employee's interests are wholly committed to the
union's control and that the union has the sole right to conduct the arbitra-
tion proceeding and to attack an adverse award. It does not follow from
this that the employee has the right to attack the arbitration award in a
plenary suit in equity; on the contrary, the only conclusion which logically
follows is that the employee is without any remedy, except as against his
own union, if he claims that the union mishandled the arbitration proceeding
or improperly failed to move to vacate the award. If this conclusion is
reached upon the premise here set forth, this is not an exaltation of proce-
dure over substance; it rests rather upon a proposition of substantive law
limiting the right of the individual employee under a collective bargaining
agreement.
(2) On the other hand, if it is held as a matter of substantive law that
the employee has a legally enforcible right as an individual under the
arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, it follows as a
matter of procedural law that he has the right to intervene as an interested
party in an arbitration proceeding brought by the union with respect to
his grievance and to move to vacate an adverse award in such a proceeding.
Thus it appears that if the employee's substantive right as an individual
is recognized, there is readily available an adequate statutory remedy to
protect that right. The statutory remedy is, of course, exclusive and must
be exercised in the manner and within the time prescribed by statute. Upon
this view of the case, the plaintiff should have intervened in the arbitration
proceeding and should have moved to vacate the award within three months
after the filing of the award. He had no right to bring suit in equity to
attack the award long after the expiration of the three month period.66
It would appear that the Court of Appeals in Parker accepted the first
of the above two approaches set forth by Judge Halpern.
C. THE RIGHT TO FAIR REPRESENTATION
67
I regard collective bargaining as a system for the private regulation
of employment conditions in a complex industrial society. For the system
to be effective, public intervention must be kept at a minimum. For the
system to be fair, quasi-constitutional limitations must be placed upon
the scope of private action. It follows that these limitations must be such
as to assure fairness in private action, without unduly hampering the
freedom of such action. From the development of the law governing
individual enforcement of the collective agreement previously described,
follows the need for channeling the effective enforcement of individual
60 283 App. Div. 410, 414-417, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713-16.
67 A comprehensive discussion will be found in Cox, "The Duty of Fair Representation,"
2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957). See also Gregory, "Fiduciary Standards and the Bargaining and
Grievance Process," 8 Lab. L.J. 843 (1957); Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Rep-
resentation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System," 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1331-43 (1958).
1959]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
rights through the instrument of collective action, namely, the union.
Any other approach, it is submitted, will substantially interfere with the
effective functioning of the collective bargaining process, and the benefits
gained from it. To allow indiscriminate individual enforcement of rights
under the collective agreement entails the risk of significantly under-
mining two important considerations in industrial relations. First, it
makes employer operations cumbersome and inefficient. The wise em-
ployer, once obliged to deal with a union, will prefer the simplicity of
one grievance procedure in which it deals with one responsible party.
And the effectiveness of the union is threatened when individual action
undermines its ability to compromise the frequently conflicting interests
of its constituency.
How, then, can individual interests be adequately protected in the
context of these institutional interests? Two avenues of approach must
be simultaneously employed. The first is an enhancement and more de-
tailed elaboration of the scope of the duty of fair representation. 8 This
approach would apply whether the duty is invoked in actions (on a tort or
trust theory) against the representative only, or in derivative actions
against the representative and (on the collective contract) against the
employer.
Two sources of the duty of the representative appear to have emerged,
both independently and simultaneously. It has been imposed as an obliga-
tion concomitant to the power of exclusive representation in the bargain-
ing unit under the two major federal labor relations statutes.0 9 It also
has been imposed under state common law of voluntary associations
70
(being an amalgam of the law of torts, agency, and contracts, with the
suggestion now that the law of trusts be added). The scope of the duty
under federal law, while embracing both the negotiation and administra-
tion of the collective agreement,7' has not gone significantly beyond pro-
hibiting discriminations on account of race and union membership.7' The
68 The second approach will be outlined in nn.96-109 infra and accompanying text.
69 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323
U.S. 248 (1944).
70 E.g., Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Station Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 207, 277 N.W.
885, 887 (1938). The duty under state law is ordinarily enunciated in the context of litiga-
tion asserting infringements on rights under collective agreements. The courts appear,
nevertheless, to have it quite clearly in mind. See Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J.
Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958), and authorities there cited at 217 Md. 566-
571, 144 A.2d 94-97.
71 Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB,
147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
72 Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1953) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318 (1953); but see Williams
v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 200 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1952).
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scope of the duty under state law is harder to define. Most of the cases
involve claimed infringements of seniority rights, in a context of union-
employer negotiations over changes of seniority arrangements favoring
some employees over others (as is inevitably inherent in such situations).
The trend in the decisions has been to uphold any negotiated arrangement
for which a plausible rationalization can be advanced.73 Federally pro-
hibited discriminations presumably would be struck down. On the other
hand, discrimination against women married to gainfully employed hus-
bands has been allowed during periods of high unemployment 74 Pre-
sumably, the general economic circumstance rendered such an arrange-
ment plausible, even though it entailed the taking away of seniority
rights previously enjoyed. There is a troublesome element present when
benefits earlier relied upon and expected to be continued in the future,
are obliterated by collective bargaining. Such benefits assume the charac-
teristics of "vesting," irrespective of contractual silence or even express
contractual language to the contrary. Yet the intricacies of particular
seniority systems are frequently so confusing and the variations (depart-
mental, plant-wide, work-classification-wide, etc.) so numerous that spo-
radic judicial intervention is so difficult as to be more apt to be disruptive
rather than corrective.
The hardest problems are presented by contract modifications directly
detrimental to money benefits already "earned." Suppose, for instance,
a majority of young employees authorize the bargaining representative
to negotiate a change in a vacation pay plan, which benefits them at the
expense of a minority of older workers. Suppose further, that the change
is made immediately prior to the vacation period due under the old plan.
May the plan be modified for the year already past-in a sense retro-
actively? May it be changed prospectively? Should express provisions
regarding vesting be deemed controlling? Should vesting of rights be
readily implied? Is it possible to draw limits which are sufficiently
specific to afford guidance, without significantly hampering the evolution
of the collective bargaining process which, of necessity, must be kept
flexible to keep pace with changing conditions in a dynamic economy?
Since collective bargaining is private socio-economic legislation, must we
not give the bargainers at least the flexibility of a legislature functioning
under a constitution? I find it exceedingly difficult to formulate a stand-
73 E.g., Capra v. Brotherhood of Firemen & Enginemen, Local Lodge No. 273, 102 Colo.
63, 76 P.2d 738 (1938); Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934); Mayo
v. Great Lakes Greyhound Lines, 333 Mich. 205, 52 N.W.2d 665 (1952); Ryan v. N.Y.
Central R.R. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N.W. 365 (1934); Belanger v. Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street Employees Local 1128, 254 Wisc. 344, 36 N.W.2d 414 (1949), 256 Wisc. 479, 41
N.W.2d 607 (1950). See Holman v. Industrial Stamping and Manufacturing Co., 344 Mich.
238, 74 N.W.2d 322 (1955).
74 Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Station Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938).
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ard going beyond the general injunction that the arrangements reached
must be rationally and plausibly defensible. They need not be, to the out-
sider, the best, the most sensible, nor even the fairest possible solution.
But a plausible explanation must be possible for the arrangement settled
upon. 75 Any more stringent limitation, on the other hand, runs the grave
risk of allowing uninformed judicial second-guessing regarding what are
usually detailed and complicated problems, solved by parties familiar
with them, often in a context of considerable conflict, with delicate bal-
ances of mutual acceptability achieved in a vortex of power, reason, and
persuasion.
76
Thus far we have considered what may be termed the quasi-legislative
aspect of collective bargaining. Although not recognized with any degree
of clarity in the decisions, there conceivably are some differences in the
duty of fair representation as applied to grievance handling. This func-
tion, in that it deals with claims of violation of existing collective con-
tracts, may be viewed as more analogous to adjudication, as contrasted
with legislation. It is arguable that, whatever the needs for flexibility and
wide discretion in the negotiation of new or modification of existing
collective contracts, no such flexibility is either needed or appropriate,
when rights under a contract are involved. The standards for judgment in
this area have been less than perfectly formulated. In general terms they
are frequently stated as follows: The union's conduct must not be wilful,
arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. The union must not have declined
,to press the grievance out of laziness or prejudice, or out of unwillingness
to expend money on behalf of non-members. Its decisions with respect to
individual grievances must have been honest and reasonable. The rejec-
tion of a grievance by the union must have been on the merits, in the
exercise of honest discretion and/or sound judgment, following a complete
and fair investigation. The rejection must not have been unjust in any
75 The decision going farthest, to my knowledge, and possibly going beyond the standard
suggested above, in according freedom of action to the union is Jennings v. Jennings, 91
N.E.2d 899 (Ohio App. 1949). There a majority of employees was allowed to distribute,
on a uniform lump sum rather than an individual inequity basis, a fund contributed by the
employer for adjustment of intra-plant wage inequities.
No very satisfactory standards for judicial review of the results of the bargaining process
'have been formulated. See Note, "Employee Challenges to Collective Bargaining Contracts:
The Scope of Judicial Review," 62 Yale L.J. 282 (1953), suggesting a "policy" test; Note,
"Duty of Union to Minority Groups in Bargaining Unit," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 490 (1952),
suggesting somewhat more sweeping review under 'a "reasonableness" test; Wellington,
"Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System," 67
Yale L.J. 1327, 1357-61 (1958). Professor Wellington suggests that the NLRB be given
authority to enforce the duty of fair representation. The same question is explored in Cox,
"The Duty of Fair Representation," 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 169-75 (1957).
76 This was substantially the conclusion reached, in a somewhat different context, by so
experienced an observer of labor relations as Harry Shulman in his "Reason, Contract, and
Law in Labor Relations," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999, 1001-02, 1024 (1955). He also had no
doubt concerning the wisdom of union control over the grievance process. Matter of Ford
Motor Co., Opinion A-69 (1944), reprinted in Cox, Cases on Labor-Law 724 (4th ed. 1958).
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respect. There must not have been bad faith or fraud. The bargaining
agent must not have acted in a negligent manner.
7
Two observations seem appropriate. The concepts derive largely from
the law of torts and trusts. And the concepts, except in "raw cases," are
not easily applied. Presumably that conduct will be characterized as
arbitrary and capricious which does not strike one as reasonable. That
gets us little further. The easiest cases would appear to be those involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, and union-employer collusion. Yet, even taking
a seemingly obvious concept such as collusion, difficulties are encountered.
Any agreement is "collusive," in the sense that two parties come together.
The grievance process necessarily entails "negotiational" overtones; it
partakes of "higgling" as well as adjudication. Nor can we have it other-
wise, if we want unions and employers to adjust their own disputes-if, in
other words, we want collective bargaining to function as a system of
industrial self-government. Take the case of three contested grievances,
equally important to the aggrieved individuals, objectively ranked in
merit, assuming this is possible, One, Two and Three, with Number One of
great importance to the union because of the breadth of its implications.
What discretion should we give the union to accept a satisfactory settle-
ment on Number One, in return for dropping Numbers Two and Three?
What discretion for accepting a satisfactory settlement on Numbers One
and Two, in return for dropping Number Three? Conversely, take the
doubtful minor seniority grievance, involving speculative damages, which
looms large to the individual employee, but would cost the employer and
the union each $250.00 to arbitrate. Should the union be required to take
it up? Should the employer, in the face of union refusal, be required to
arbitrate with the individual involved, even assuming the latter is willing
to pay half the cost? Consider, finally, the application of a proposed
"negligence" standard. What tests apply? The "reasonable man" test?
Should we devise a test for a "professional" collective bargaining repre-
sentative? For this is, after all, what unions hold themselves out to be:
large, experienced, well-staffed and successful. Should the test, perhaps,
be different for the inarticulate, newly elected local union official from
that applied to the experienced business agent, or the highly trained re-
search director of a large national union? Suppose the situation of a
newly elected, inexperienced shop steward, being the immediate bargain-
ing representative of some 100 employees. An employee leaves a grievance
slip with him. The steward puts it into his overall pocket, honestly and
with good intentions. The overalls are washed, the slip is lost, memory
77 The standards are paraphrased from the decisions cited by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 566-571, 144
A.2d 88, 94-97 (1958). They are typical of those found in scores of decisions.
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lapses, and the contractual time limitations for the filing of the grievance
go by. Such cases happen.7 1 Who is liable? Not the employer, even
though he breached the contract, for no timely grievance was filed. The
union? The steward? But he was inexperienced, perhaps excited by the
weight of his new responsibilities, and the people's choice! Perhaps the
grievant voted for him, made him his agent, even campaigned for him!
Perhaps the grievant opposed him, even ran against him, and now sues
him! Where, in such cases should the law's sympathies fall?
It is at this point that it may again be urged to allow individual en-
forcement of contract rights as an alternative. Attention can be drawn
to the system, used in Europe, allowing for individual or union enforce-
ment of rights under the labor contract before a complex system of special
labor courts established for that purpose.7 9 In other words, one is
tempted to encourage by-passing the inexperienced shop steward, the
private grievance machinery, and all its higgling, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the individual worker. Some important points may be lost sight
of. First, absent collective bargaining, no enforceable right to grieve
exists at all in the industrial context. There is no constitutional guarantee
of the right to petition the employer. Second, do we not burn the barn to
roast the pig? The basic values of our labor relations system are those of
private rather than public, voluntary rather than governmental, self-
regulation. This has allowed for contractual, instead of statutory regula-
tion of employment, for flexibility, rather than rigidity. It has been
accomplished through the instrument of a labor movement, which, for
all its faults, has been shop and job-conscious, rather than primarily
politically conscious. And third, by encouraging the by-passing of the
inexperienced shop-steward, do we not destroy a significant link between
the employee and the bargaining instrumentality? Over the undemo-
cratic nature of this instrumentality we are already disturbed. If we
reduce its in-plant function, do we not accelerate the tendency toward
hierarchical bureaucratization, toward remoteness from constituency?
A leading decision dealing with the scope of the bargaining representa-
tive's authority in the handling of grievances is Elgin, Joliet and Eastern
Ry. v. Burley. 0 Burley and nine other employees sought back pay over a
number of years to which they considered themselves entitled under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. Their claim had been pre-
sented by the union's Grievance Committee, and a compromise settlement
was agreed upon between the committee and the employer. The em-
78 See Case Number 8, Glenn D. Conger v. Local Union 735, Proceedings, 16th Constitu-
tional Convention, International Union, United Automobile Workers, pp. 405-08, (1957).
79 See McPherson, "Basic Issues in German Labor Court Structure," 5 Lab. LJ. 439
(1954); Braun, "Labor Disputes and Their Settlement," Pt. IV (1955).
80 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
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ployees were dissatisfied, and asserted that they had not authorized the
compromise. Their claim was then taken before the Railroad Adjustment
Board. The Board accepted the settlement as conclusive, and denied the
claim. The employees then commenced suit in Federal District Court,
alleging a violation of the collective agreement. The District Court
rendered summary judgment for the employer. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed,81 holding that it was error not to have decided, as an
issue of fact, the question of the union's authority to compromise the
grievance.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 2 and affirmed, five to four. The
majority of the Court agreed that the question of the union's authority
was one which needed to be determined upon the facts.83 But beyond
this, Justice Rutledge devoted a considerable portion of his opinion to the
distinction between a union's authority to negotiate contracts establishing
rights of employees in futuro, and its authority to negotiate with the
employer concerning "accrued" rights under existing agreements. 4 This
approach precipitated a sharp dissent from Justice Frankfurter:
This is not a simple little case about an agent's authority. Demands of
the employee's representative imply not only authority from those for
whom he speaks but the duty of respect from those to whom he speaks ....
We do not have the ordinary case where a third person dealing with an
ostensible agent must at his peril ascertain the agent's authority. In such a
situation a person may protect himself by refusing to deal. Here petitioner
has a duty to deal. If petitioner refuses to deal with the officials of the
employees' union by challenging their authority, it does so under pain of
penalty. If it deals with them on the reasonable belief that the grievance
officials of the Brotherhood are acting in accordance with customary union
procedure, settlements thus made ought not to be at the hazard of being
jettisoned by future litigation. To allow such settlements to be thus set
aside is to obstruct the smooth working of the Act. It undermines the confi-
dence so indispensable to adjustment by negotiation, which is the vital
object of the Act ....s5
Justice Frankfurter then discussed, somewhat unnecessarily (as the
action was only against the employer, and not against the union) but
persuasively, the considerations mitigating against allowing suits by em-
ployee-members over employment disputes, without prior exhaustion of
remedies available within the union:
Union membership generates complicated relations. Policy counsels against
judicial intrusion upon these relations. If resort to courts is at all avail-
able, it certainly should not disregard and displace the arrangements which
the members of the organization voluntarily establish for their reciprocal
81 140 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1943).
82 323 U.S. 690 (1944).
88 325 U.S. at 748-49.
84 Id. at 722-41.
85 Id. at 755-56.
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interests and by which they bound themselves to be governed. The rights
and duties of membership are governed by the rules of the Brotherhood....
To ask courts to adjudicate the meaning of the Brotherhood rules and
customs without preliminary resort to remedial proceedings within the
Brotherhood is to encourage influences of disruption within the union in-
stead of fostering these unions as stabilizing forces. Rules of fraternal
organizations, with all the customs and assumptions that give them life, can-
not be treated as though they were ordinary legal documents of settled
meaning. "Freedom of litigation, for instance, is hardly so essential a part
of the democratic process that the courts should be asked to strike down all
hindrances to its pursuit. The courts are as wise, to take an example of
this, in adhering to the general requirement that all available remedies
within the union be exhausted before redress is sought before them as they
are unwise in many of the exceptions they have grafted upon this rule."
Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union (1941) 50 Yale L.J. 621,
630...
If, when a dispute arises over the meaning of a collective agreement, the
legally designated railroad bargaining unit cannot negotiate with the car-
rier without first obtaining the specific authorization of every individual
member of the union who may be financially involved in the dispute. it
not only weakens the union by encouraging divisive elements. It gravely
handicaps the union in its power to bargain responsibly. That is not all.
Not to allow the duly elected officers of an accredited union to speak for
its membership in accordance with the terms of the internal government of
the union and to permit any member of the union to pursue his own interest
under a collective agreement undermines the very conception of a collective
agreement .... To allow every individual worker to base individual claims
on his private notions of the scope and meaning of a collective agreement
intended to lay down uniform standards for all those covered by the col-
lective agreement, is to permit juries and courts to make varying findings
and give varying constructions to an agreement inevitably couched in words
or phrases reflecting the habits, usage and understanding of the railroad
industry. Thus will be introduced those dislocating differentiations for
workers in the same craft which have always been among the most fertile
provocations to friction, strife, and strike .... s1
The decision engendered considerable protest from interested parties,
and the Court granted a petition for rehearing. 7 Upon reargument, the
earlier decision was affirmed. 8 Justice Rutledge, in another opinion,
included language, however, which came close to taking the heart out
of the plaintiff's case. He suggested that where the settlement was
reached by the union representatives in accordance with custom and
Kusage, this may be an adequate basis of authority-"9 Further, if the indi-
vidual employee has knowledge or notice of what is transpiring with
reference to his claim, he may not stand by and attack a settlement, after
it has been reached, because he is dissatisfied with the outcome of the
negotiations.0 Justice Frankfurter, in another dissent, charged that the
86 Id. at 757-59.
87 326 U.S. 801 (1945).
88 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
89 Id. at 663.
90 Id. at 665-66.
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majority, although in form adhering to the earlier result, had so modified
the decision as to extract "from it almost all of its vitality."91 Justice
Rutledge, prophetically, included the following footnote in his opinion:
"Furthermore, so far as union members are concerned, and they are the
only persons involved as respondents in this cause, it is altogether pos-
sible for the union to secure authority in these respects within well estab-
lished rules relating to unincorporated organizations and their relations
with their members, by appropriate provisions in their by-laws, constitu-
tion or other governing regulations, as well as by usage or custom.
'9 2
The suggestion appears to have been taken to heart. In 1955, Justice
Frankfurter was able to write as follows: "[Unions] were quick to secure
amendment to their constitutions or statutes in order to avoid the deci-
sion of this Court in [the Burley case].""
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers amended their Standing Rules
to provide for automatic consent of all members to the Brotherhood's prose-
cution of grievances at their Tenth Triennial Convention in March and
April 1947. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
added a similar provision to their Constitution at their 35th Convention in
1947. The Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen amended their
"statute" in a similar fashion in 1946. The Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men at their 1946 Convention adopted a new General Rule which em-
powered the Brotherhood to prosecute grievances "Except in individual
cases where the member or members involved serve seasonable written
notice on the Brotherhood to the contrary."94
The result of the Burley case is, thus, to place control over individual
grievances into the representative's hands in any instance where the
union in its by-laws sets forth its bargaining authority with sufficient
breadthY5 In consequence, the individual member-employee remains in
the position of having his employment rights both protected and con-
trolled by the collective bargaining representative.
91 Id. at 668.
92 Id. at 663 n.2.
93 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437, 458 (1955).
94 Id. at 458 n.28.
95 Typical provisions were added to the constitution of the United Auto Workers' Union
in 1946, and retained since:
The International Union and the Local Union to which the member belongs shall
be his exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment, and for
the negotiation and execution of contracts with employers covering all such matters,
including contracts requiring his membership or the continuance of his membership
in the union as a condition of his employment or continued employment, and contracts
requiring the employer to deduct, collect, or assist in collecting from his wages any
dues, fees, assessments, fines or other contributions payable to the International Union
or his Local Union.
The International Union and the Local Union to which the member belongs, and
each of them, are by him irrevocably designated, authorized and empowered ex-
clusively to appear and act for him and in his behalf before any board, court, committee
or other tribunal in any matter affecting his status as an employee or as a member of
his Local Union or the International Union, and exclusively to act as his agent to
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D. MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION
6
If the basis of our policy is to be one of channeling enforcement of and
control over individual rights into and through the collective bargaining
relationship, the collective bargaining agent must not only be obliged to
act fairly and honestly, but the union must also contain within itself
channels for expression and participation through which the individual's
voice can make itself felt. Only thus can it be legitimately asserted that
collective representation should be given priority. Only thus do we have
assurance that collective representation will be fair, honest, and effective.
The price, then, of any concession in the direction of union control over
individual interests is union responsibility. What this entails, in my judg-
ment, beyond meeting strictest requirements of honesty and perform-
ance at a level of at least reasonable efficiency, is as high a degree of
democratic self-government as is consistent with the functions which we
expect unions to perform in our economy. 7
It is for this reason that recent legislative concern with union finances,
conflicts of interest of union officials, fair and open elections, control of
local unions by national officers through the trusteeship device, and with
rights of union members generally, seems to me to be the most fruitful
area of exploration for dealing with the problem of individual rights in
collective labor relations.9" Our policy, we noted at the outset, is con-
fronted with a paradox. We support collective bargaining because it
enhances employee rights in an industrial economy of large-scale enter-
prise. Yet by doing so, we also submerge the individual in collective insti-
represent and bind him in the py-entation, prosecution, adjustment and settlement
of all grievances, complaints or-disputes of any kind or character arising out of the
employer-employee relationship, as fully and to all intents and purposes as he might or
could do if personally present.
Compare also the following provision in the grievance procedure set forth in the UAW-
Ford Motor Company Agreement (Art. VII):
The National Ford Department [of the Union] is authorized to withdraw or settle
with the Company any grievance appealed by the Union to the Umpire at any time
before it is heard by the Umpire.
96 For some comprehensive and path-breaking works in the field, see generally Summers,
"Disciplinary Powers of Unions," 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483 (1950); "Disciplinary Pro-
cedures of Unions," 4 id. 15 (1950); "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 1049 (1951); "The Right to Join a Union," 47 Colum. L. Rev. 33 (1947). See
also Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609 (1959);
Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a
Federal System," 67 Yale L.J. 1327 (1958).
97 Undemocratic practices of unions are sometimes defended on grounds that they are
necessary to enable unions to deal with centrally controlled employers, that the tactics and
strategy of collective bargaining require the efficiency of a quasi-military operation, and
that "delivering the economic goods" is more important than democratic membership rights.
All these elements do place limits on the degree of possible membership participation in
varying situations. But the limits should be imposed only insofar as necessary to enable
unions effectively to discharge their bargaining function, and not be used as an excuse for
going beyond the point of necessity. Of course, this point is not always easy to find.
The position that this point is impossible to locate is maintained in Magrath, "Democracy
in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy," 12 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 503 (1959).
98 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2953 et seq. For relevant state legislation, see N.Y.
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tutions. The union makes the place of work a more democratic one by
substituting bilateral bargaining for unilateral control and dictation. We
must now make the union more democratic to assure that it will be more
responsive to individual and minority interests, by giving holders of these
interests adequate means of making their voice felt within the union.
This is not a perfect solution. Such solutions are rare in an imperfect
world. Instances still will occur that outrage the civil-libertarian purist.
But a considerable forward step will thereby be taken, nevertheless, and
I am not certain that it is possible at this juncture to go much beyond,
without seriously jeopardizing collective bargaining itself, which neces-
sarily remains the cornerstone of our labor policy.
One point seems to me to be elemental. The right to union membership
needs to be enhanced. For the individual employee to make his voice felt
in the union requires that he be allowed to join and to participate. The
law has done an appalling amount of pussy-footing in failing to recognize
that the union is a sufficiently significant instrument in the working lives of
people so as to require modification of the general rule that a voluntary
association is free to reject for membership anyone it pleases0 9 Begin-
nings have been made, in some jurisdictions, along three lines: (1) in the
form of anti-discrimination legislation;' (2) by decisions, holding that
where the union controls the right to employment by the closed-shop
device, the union may not also be a closed union; 101 and (3) by holding
unions, acting under governmental protection, to be quasi-public instru-
mentalities which may not practice unconstitutional discriminations. 0 2
Labor and Management Improper Practices Act, Ch. 451, L. 1959, McKinney's Session
Laws 558-568 (1959). Simultaneous legislative activity on the federal and state level is
apt to precipitate some confusion but current Congressional thinking seems to favor con-
current jurisdiction. See e.g., §§ 103, 306, 603 and 604 of the new federal Act. The wisdom
of federal legislation is questioned in Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representa-
tion: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System," 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1351-56 (1958).
Compare Summers, "The Role of Legislation in Internal Union Affairs, Proceedings, Indus-
trial Relations Research Association," 260, 267-70 (1959).
99 E.g., Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1938);
Colson v. Gelber, 192 Misc. 520, 80 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); 87
CJ.S. Trade Unions § 33 (1954) ; none of the cases dealing with discriminatory representa-
tion in violation of the federal duty by unions applying discriminatory membership policies,
solves the latter problem. E.g., Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204
(1944); Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 156 F. Supp.
89 (E.D. Ohio 1957), aff'd, 262 Fed. 2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957).
Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 33 (1947).
100 E.g., N.Y. Civil Rights Law, N.Y. Session Laws 1940, Ch. 9, § 43, para. 1.
101 James v. Marineship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Williams v.
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946) ; Thorman
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958),
modifying and affirming 307 P.2d 1026 (1st Dist. Ct. App.). See Clark v. Curtis, 297 N.Y.
1014, 80 N.E.2d 536 (1948), affirming 273 App. Div. 797, 76 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1947); cf. Wilson
v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Ati. 720
(1938); Carroll v. Local 269, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 133 NJ.
Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223 (1943); but see Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677
(1941); Kelly v. Simons, 87 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1949).
102 Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
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Federal prohibition of the closed shop °3 makes the second of these ap-
proaches relatively less useful. Yet, this prohibition does not deal with
the problem of enabling anyone bargained for by a union to wield influ-
ence within the union by a right to membership. Yet not even the some-
what free-wheeling "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations,"
sponsored by Senator McClellan, 10 4 dealt with this problem. Both this,
and the toned-down version passed by the Congress, 10 5 dealt only with
rights of individuals already in labor organizations. It would appear a
modest enough suggestion that legislation is needed to protect the right
of any employee in a unit represented by an exclusive collective bargain-
ing representative to join and freely participate in the union, subject only
to the union's right to exclude individuals whom it could expel from
membership under existing legal limitations on unions' disciplinary
powers over present members.' 0 6 For, paradoxically, the law has con-
siderably matured in protecting members of unions against arbitrary
expulsions and fines. It did this in a context now largely irrelevant.
When loss of union membership for any reason meant loss of employ-
ment under a closed shop agreement, the courts were not reluctant to
intervene. 0 7 But now, under Taft-Hartley, loss of employment may
follow only where there is a refusal to pay regular dues. 08 Much larger
now looms the need for a right to union membership, for the purpose of
influencing union policy. It is here that improvements must be made.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in detail the areas of
internal union government where improvements are needed, or how
current legislation proposes to deal with these. I shall limit myself to
a few concluding observations. First, I disagree with those who suggest
that making unions more open and democratic will not go far toward
correcting the problems we have been considering.' To deny that there
are great benefits to be derived from a free and open exchange within
103 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952); 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(2) (1952).
104 The McClellan amendment, which was first accepted and then rejected by the Senate,
was taken from Title I of S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), deleting an eligibility for
membership provision of the original bill. See 105 Cong. Rec. 5795-5827.
105 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, conference report on
S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Title I.
106 The suggestion is advanced in Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democ-
racy," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 621-24 (1959). This approach is followed in the Massachusetts
Labor Relations Act, §§ 4, 6A, Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Ch. 150A, §§ 4 and 6A, as
amended by laws 1947, Ch. 657. See generally Cox, op. cit. supra, 612-624; Summers, "Legal
Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1062-1083 (1951).
107 See Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A.2d 886 (1939); Thompson v.
Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91
S.W. 834 (1905).
108 See n.103 supra.
109 Compare Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Respon-
sibility in a Federal System," 67 Yale L.J., 1327, 1342, 1356 (1958) with Rauth, "Civil
Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions," 8 Lab. L.J. 874, 875 (1957).
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the union, to deny that admitting a minority group to membership will
serve to reduce substantially the negotiation of discriminatory contract
provisions, is to question the efficacy of the democratic process itself.
The active individual member, or the active minority group of members,
if protected in the right to admission and participation, will certainly
help to shape the direction of the union's policy. This approach is not a
cure-all. But it is in keeping with the tenet that, in a democracy, the
individual should be placed in a context where, acting in self-reliance,
he can help himself.
Second, and largely in keeping with the preceding point, the rule
requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies prior to suit seems to
me to deserve preservation, even if in modified form. This rule by
virtue of its many exceptions, in many states has been rendered virtually
non-existent.'10 These have been grafted on it, in part, perhaps, because
of suspicion as to the fairness of union tribunals and because of the
time required to exhaust remedies where the highest union tribunal
meets every three or four years. Recent legislation would limit the
time allowed for internal proceedings to four months."' This approach
has much to commend it, especially if coupled with a revitalization of
the rule itself. For the rule is valuable in encouraging private adjust-
ment, self-correction, and fair internal procedures." 2  These benefit
not only the association, but also the members, and the courts. Finally,
it might be suggested that a rule should be considered favoring volun-
tary impartial review, by according unions providing for such review in
their constitutions some advantages, such as a longer period for internal
determinations, or presumptions of their propriety." 3  For only by
making unions more democratic and responsive, as well as responsible,
can we preserve the values of individualism and voluntarism in an
industrial economy which apparently can only function by means of
large-scale organizations.
110 See Summers, Legal Limitations on 'Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1086-
1092 (1951); Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50 Yale L.J. 621, 630-31, n.35
(1941).
111 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, conference report on
S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Sec. 101(a) (4).
112 See Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 Yale
L.I. 369 (1956); Witmer, "Civil Liberties and the Trade Union," 50 Yale L.. 621, 630-31
(1941).
13 A somewhat similar approach was employed in the Kennedy bill, S. 3454, 85 Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958) in connection with the proposed NLRB review of trusteeships by parent
bodies over local unions. It exempted unions from such review if they set up their own
permanent independent review board. This provision was dropped prior to passage of the
Kennedy-Ives bill by the Senate. Yet the advantages of this approach are obvious in
encouragement of independent review agencies such as have been established by the
Upholsterers' International Union and the United Auto Workers. It is of some interest
to observe that the broad jurisdiction of the UAW Public Review Board embraces claims
that a shop grievance "was improperly handled because of fraud, discrimination, or collusion
with management." UAW Constitution (1957) Art. 32, § 8(b). Compare discussion,
pp. 27-29, supra. Nn.77-78, supra, and accompanying text.
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